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Abstract 
Using linked employer-employee data, this paper estimates the effect of collective bargaining coverage 
on wages over an interval of continuing decline in unionism. Unobserved firm and worker heterogeneity 
is dealt with using two establishment sub-samples, comprising collective bargaining joiners and never 
members on the one hand and collective bargaining leavers and always members on the other, each in 
combination with subsets of worker job stayers. The counterfactuals are then reversed for robustness 
checks. Joining a sectoral agreement is found always to produce higher wages, while leaving one no 
longer produces wage losses if the transition is to a firm agreement. Leaving a firm agreement to non- 
coverage also leads to wage reductions, while joining one from non-coverage seems decreasingly 
favourable. The reverse counterfactuals yield correspondingly smaller estimates (in absolute value) of 
wage development than reported for the initial counterfactuals. Finally, although small, the union wage 
gap persists.  
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1. Introduction 
Most information on the union-nonunion differential in Germany – strictly, the wage gap 
between covered and uncovered workers – pertains to the 1990s or early 2000s. Yet, as is 
widely known, German unions have been in retreat both during and subsequent to these 
intervals. It is the very breadth of decline that makes investigation of the more recent interval 
more compelling. First, union density has fallen sharply. The decline can be dated from the mid-
1980s, the sudden rise in membership after 1989 proving to be little more than a diversion. 
Accordingly, union density declined from 36 per cent in 1991 in the aftermath of unification to 
19.3 per cent in 2009 (see Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Wang, 2006; Addison, Schnabel, and 
Wagner, 2007; Binspinck, Dribbusch, and Schulten, 2010).  By way of qualification, Hirsch and 
Schnabel’s (2011) measure of union bargaining power, based on a right-to-manage model of 
collective bargaining, suggests that the fall off in union strength occurred mostly after 1999, 
remaining fairly stable in the 1990s despite a fairly uniform drop in density over the entire 
period.  
Second, overall collective bargaining coverage as a share of employment fell in western 
Germany (eastern Germany) from 76 (63) per cent in 1998 to 65 (51) per cent in 2009 (see 
Binspinck, Dribbusch, and Schulten, 2010).1 The corollary was a continuing rise in the bargaining 
free sector.  
Third, the decline in collective bargaining coverage was not deflected by a growth in 
“orientation” in the uncovered sector, nor was it to receive any support from the “extension 
principle.” Orientation refers to a process whereby uncovered firms claim to shadow the terms 
of sectoral agreements. The coverage of orienting firms in the private sector rose from 17.9 per 
cent of employment in 2000 to 22.4 per cent in 2010. This rising trend only partially 
compensated for the decline in sectoral bargaining: the share of employees covered by sectoral 
agreements fell from 59.9 to 49.3 per cent over the same interval. Moreover, these are simple 
frequencies. The wages paid by orienting firms have been shown to lie well below those set 
under collective bargaining (see Addison et al., 2012). As far as the extension of collective 
agreements to employees and employers not bound by the relevant sectoral agreement is 
concerned this, too, has evinced pronounced decline. For example, considering just the 
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extension of primary collective agreements under the 1949 Collective Agreement Act, their 
number fell from 408 (or 5.4 per cent of all such agreements) to just 245 (1.5 per cent) in 2009 
(Bispinck, Dribbusch, and Schulten, 2010).  
Finally, German sectoral collective bargaining has been buffeted by decentralization in 
the form of opening clauses and pacts for employment and competitiveness (see, respectively, 
Bispinck, 2004; Seifert and Massa-Wirth, 2005). Abstracting from the issue of whether the 
process has been destabilizing or fragmenting – so-called “internal erosion” (on which, see  
Hassel, 1999, inter al.) – the very extensive contractual innovations in question involved such 
elements as hardship clauses allowing firms in economic difficulties to deviate from sectorally-
agreed provisions, temporary cuts in pay to safeguard jobs, the introduction of profit-related 
pay substituting for previously guaranteed elements of the remuneration package, and 
concession bargaining more generally (see, for example,  Haipeter and Lehndorff, 2009).  
The very scale of these developments in Europe’s largest economy makes Germany an 
interesting case for consideration. One primary interest is of course macroeconomic in scope. 
Specifically, has increasingly decentralized bargaining produced greater flexibility (i.e. 
improved) responsiveness of wages to their underlying determinants thereby benefiting 
employment, or, by analogy with concerns expressed after the collapse of the Swedish model, 
have the advantages associated with a coordinated system of bargaining been so compromised 
as to lead to the opposite outcome?2 There is also a European-wide dimension to these 
developments, given the role of Germany in shaping EU social policy and institutions. 
Our own concerns are less far ranging given the unsettled nature of research into the 
union premium, let alone its course through time. The focus of the present treatment is, then, 
to discover what has been happening to the union wage gap in the first decade of the 2000s. It 
offers a critical albeit partial first step in the analysis of the consequences of the decline in 
unionism. It is partial because an estimate of average wage differences does not inform us 
about the distribution of wages. A small premium may be consistent with a large effect in the 
lower reaches of the distribution. Even if declines in the wage gap are unlikely to be undone by 
distributional effects, the latter require explicit consideration in future research. But, to repeat, 
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basic knowledge of the effect of unions on average wages is itself underdeveloped and remains 
the basis of the present inquiry. 
The paper proceeds as follows. We first review the state of play on the union wage gap, 
drawing upon the German (and, briefly, the U.S.) literature. We then outline our unique 
dataset, namely the cross sectional version of the linked employer-employee data supported by 
the German Institute for Employment Research. Our analysis is based on two (three-year) 
clouds of data at each end of the sample period 2000-2010, exploiting changes in establishment 
collective bargaining status over time. Our estimates of union wage effects are obtained by 
comparing the wage growth of workers employed by plants joining or leaving collective 
bargaining with that of workers employed by establishments that did not change their 
collective bargaining status – never members and always members, respectively. (These 
counterfactuals are then reversed for robustness.) Our main finding is that joining a sectoral 
agreement is found always to produce higher wages, while leaving one no longer produces 
wage losses if the transition is to a firm agreement. Leaving a firm agreement to non-coverage 
also leads to wage reductions, while joining one from non-coverage seems decreasingly 
favourable. The reverse counterfactuals in turn yield correspondingly smaller estimates (in 
absolute value) of wage development than reported for the initial counterfactuals. 
 
2. A Review of the Literature on the Collective Bargaining Premium 
Recent studies of the magnitude of the collective bargaining premium in Germany use either 
the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES) or the Linked Employer-Employee Dataset of 
the Institute for Employment Research (LIAB). The thrust of studies using the GSES has been 
upon distributional issues, while those based on the LIAB have more often (though not 
exclusively) considered the effects of collective bargaining on wages and rent sharing.3 
Furthermore, the GSES studies lack a longitudinal capacity, limiting inferences that can be made 
about causality. Note, finally, that the wage gap in Germany refers to coverage rather than 
membership since German constitutional law – specifically Article 9 of the Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz) – does not allow collective agreements to discriminate against non-union 
members.   
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The main GSES studies that also examine the wage gap in addition to distributional 
issues are: (a) Stephan and Gerlach (2005) who use a regional manufacturing subsample from 
Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) of the GSES for the 1990, 1995, and 2001 waves; (b) 
Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Lembcke (2013) who use the full survey for 2001 but focus on prime-
age male employees in West Germany; and (c) Antoncyzk (2010) who deploys the same GSES 
sample for 2001 but who seeks to account for the endogeneity of collective bargaining.4 
Stephan and Gerlach’s multi-level model provides estimates of the wage of an average worker 
in an average firm applying individual contracts (i.e. a no collective bargaining regime), and of 
the differentials that would apply had that worker been employed in an otherwise average firm 
with either an industry collective agreement or a firm-level agreement. In 1990 the estimated 
wage premium was 4 per cent in the case of sectoral contracts and 3 per cent for firm-level 
contracts. Higher coverage premia are reported for the later sample years: respectively 9 and 
12 per cent in 1995, and 7 and 11 per cent in 2001.5, 6 
 The study by Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Lembcke’s (2013) is notable for its consideration 
of the wages of uncovered workers in covered firms and the role of (exogenous) union density 
in the relevant labour market segment in addition to firm coverage effects. The authors’ OLS 
results indicate that firms applying a collective agreement pay higher wages on average; 
specifically, the greater the share of workers in a firm covered by a collective contract, the 
higher are wages on average – and somewhat more so in the case of firm-level than sectoral 
agreements. For its part, an increase in union density reinforces the positive effects of higher 
coverage at firm level (while lowering wages in the uncovered sector). That said, individual 
coverage by a collective agreement in a covered firm shows a negative impact on the wage 
level, and the authors’ separate quantile regression analysis shows that this effect is elevated at 
higher quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. In other words, collective bargaining 
coverage serves to reduce wage inequality – reminding us that the main thrust of analyses 
based on the GSES is upon distributional issues.7  
Antonczyk (2010) seeks to measure the causal effect of collective bargaining in 2001 – 
actually, sectoral bargaining alone – on wages, using two instrumental variables measured at 
district level; specifically, the share of Protestants and Catholics (the expectation being that 
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Catholics are more likely to favour unionism), and historic gross union density (i.e. employed 
and unemployed union members as a share of employees). These variables are meant to 
provide exogenous variation in the treatment variable. Antonczyk reports the average 
treatment effect on wages or union wage effect, namely the expected gain from coverage of a 
randomly assigned individual with a given set of observable characteristics.8 The upshot of this 
procedure is that the simple cet. par. coverage premium shrinks from 3.6 log points to just 0.8 
log points, the bulk of the unadjusted differential seemingly reflecting the fact that individuals 
undergoing treatment have higher unobserved productivity than those undergoing the 
treatment. 
Studies using the LIAB are sparse and, as noted earlier, are less concerned with 
distributional issues than with the effects of coverage on levels of wages and rents. The 
principal study is by Gürtzgen (2012), using data from the 1995-2008 LIAB for western German 
mining and manufacturing establishments. Gürtzgen presents OLS, establishment fixed effects, 
and spell fixed effects estimates of a wage equation where the dependent variable is the log 
daily wage.  In the establishment fixed effects specification, the collective bargaining coverage 
premium is identified from establishments that change their contract status. The spell fixed 
effects specification first differences log wages within each individual-establishment cell, 
removing unobserved firm and worker heterogeneity. Raw coverage differentials of 20 log 
points for sectoral bargains and 29 log points for firm bargaining are reduced by 70 and 80 per 
cent, respectively, in the OLS specification with the full set of controls. More importantly, these 
much reduced coverage premia vanish once the non-random selection of firms into bargaining 
regime is controlled for and also under spell differencing designed to control for the possibility 
that plants changing their bargaining status might at the same time also  experience a change in 
unobserved worker skills.  
Finally, in the most contentious part of her analysis, Gürtzgen turns to the role of time-
specific unobservables, the concern being that establishments that change their coverage 
status might be subject to different time-specific unobservables than are those maintaining the 
original contract status. To investigate this endogeneity issue, she adopts a trend-adjusted 
difference-in-difference estimator, analysing separate transitions from one bargaining regime 
7 
 
to another (six cases in all) and allowing for differences in changes in time-specific shocks by 
subtracting the differential in wage growth in pre-transition intervals. Gürtzgen concludes from 
these comparisons of the wage growth of individuals experiencing a change in contract status 
with the wage growth of individuals employed by stable plants that there is no “true” wage 
effect of exiting sectoral bargaining to non-coverage.  Although such individuals may experience 
wage losses, this outcome is indicative of the correlation of the transition with (more) negative 
demand shocks. The interpretation of firm collective bargaining transitions is altogether more 
nuanced, however, with some transitions leading to positive differentials and others giving rise 
to negative differentials, so that the small insignificant premium for firm-level collective 
bargaining reported in the main estimation exercise represents the net effect of these different 
influences. This latter part of Gürtzgen’s analysis is rather speculative. The problem resides of 
course in implementing the adjusted difference-in-difference estimator (on which more below). 
We conclude this section with some contextual remarks on the evolving U.S. literature. 
While the preponderance of American research has focused on the union membership 
premium – and also unlike the research reviewed here has continued to obtain some very large 
estimates of that particular premium using both cross sectional and longitudinal analysis of 
individual wage data9– some more recent studies offer a closer match with the German 
literature in focusing on the wage effects of establishments becoming unionized. We refer to 
studies of union representation elections comparing establishments in which unions became 
recognized by a close margin of the vote with those in which they barely lost, and where 
evidence of a discontinuous relation between the vote share and wages is deemed to be the 
causal impact of unionization. Such regression discontinuity studies by DiNardo and Lee (2004) 
and Frandsen (2012) produce German-type estimates of the wage gap, and attribute the results 
of past U.S. research using individual data to the contribution of unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. 
Yet lest we draw premature conclusions about likely convergence in the two literatures, 
it should also be noted that recent U.S. studies in the more conventional event-study tradition 
still find large effects of new unionization on publicly-traded firms’ equity values. Lee and Mas 
(2012), in particular, obtain estimates of lost market value attendant upon unionization that 
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translate into a union coverage premium of 10 per cent. Importantly, these authors further 
argue that such equity losses are increasing in the union vote share in representation elections.  
Against this backdrop, the present exercise which seeks to obtain estimates of the 
course of the union wage gap at a time of unambiguously declining union authority and 
controlling for unobserved firm and worker heterogeneity gains additional purchase.  
 
3. The Dataset 
The present study uses the LIAB Cross-Sectional Model Version 2 1993-2010 (LIAB QM2 9310) 
of the linked employer-employee data supported by the Institute for Employment 
Research/Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB). The LIAB data are created at the 
Research Data Center (Forschungsdatenzentrum, or FDZ) of the Federal Employment 
Agency/Bundesagentur für Arbeit by linking the establishment data from the annual waves of 
the IAB Establishment Panel (Betriebspanel) with information on individuals from the social 
security records of the German Federal Employment Agency.  
The IAB Establishment Panel is a large-scale annual establishment survey that covers up 
to 16,000 establishments every year, beginning in 1993 in West Germany and extended in 1996 
to the former East Germany. The participating establishments are surveyed on a large number 
of employment policy-related subjects. These include employment development, business 
policy and business development, collective bargaining, personnel structure and recruitment, 
remuneration, and working time. The survey is unique in Germany, since it is representative for 
all industries and establishment sizes nationwide and is conceived as a longitudinal survey. 
Therefore, it enables researchers to analyse developments over time and to conduct 
longitudinal studies of individual establishments as well. (For further information on the IAB 
Establishment Survey, see Fischer et al., 2009). 
The information on individual workers in the LIAB dataset comes from the social security 
records of the German Federal Employment Agency and covers all employees of the 
establishments surveyed in the IAB Establishment Panel. Specifically, it includes both 
employees who are liable to social security and also employees who are marginally part-time 
employed (geringfügig beschäftigt). For these employees, several demographic characteristics 
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such as gender, age, nationality, level of education, occupational group, employment status and 
place of residence are provided. Furthermore, the data contain the individual daily wage of an 
employee. The latter is measured with high accuracy by the authorities since this wage 
information is decisive in calculating an individual’s social security payments. 
In sum, the LIAB dataset is a unique data source for analysing both the supply side and 
the demand side the German labour market along various dimensions. Due to its coverage, it is 
one of the best-suited datasets for investigating the effects of collective bargaining coverage on 
the wages of individual workers in Germany. Several versions of the LIAB data including cross-
sectional and longitudinal subsamples can be accessed for scientific purposes at the FDZ in 
Nuremberg. 
We have undertaken several modifications to adapt the data to fit our research 
purposes. In the first place, in order to improve the quality of the linkage between the survey 
data and the administrative data, we adopted the procedure that is followed by the FDZ for 
some of the longitudinal versions of the LIAB, erasing observations that exhibit a bad linkage 
quality. In the FDZ procedure, a link is defined as having a bad quality if the number of 
employees and apprentices that an establishment has reported in the IAB Establishment Panel 
deviates significantly from the number of employees and apprentices that is calculated from 
the administrative data. (For information on this procedure, see Jacobebbinghaus, 2008: 53f.)  
Second, other modifications concern the key wage variable that is central to our 
analysis. In the LIAB data, the reported individual wage of a worker is the gross daily wage. 
Fringe benefits are included only if they are subject to social security. Since there exists an 
upper contribution limit in the German social security system – set annually for western and 
eastern Germany by the German government – the gross daily wages in these data are top-
coded; in our dataset, this affects about 15 (10) per cent of the observations for western 
(eastern) Germany. We therefore imputed the wages above the contribution limit, using the 
procedure suggested by Gartner (2005). First, we estimated a Tobit regression of log daily 
wages on individual and establishment characteristics separately for both parts of the country 
and for each single year. Following Gartner (2005), we then constructed a truncated normal 
distribution by using the predicted values from the Tobit estimation as moments and by setting 
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the lower truncation point equal to the contribution limit. Finally, we replaced censored wage 
observations by values randomly drawn from this truncated normal distribution. Furthermore, 
we deflated wages using the Consumer Price Index published by the German Federal Statistical 
Office; specifically, all wages are expressed in year 2000 values. 
Third, because only a very broad measure of individual working hours is contained in the 
dataset – in particular, for part-time workers, whether working hours are less or greater than 
18 per week – we restricted our analysis to full-time employed workers who are subject to 
social security. We further excluded those full-time workers who were recorded as receiving an 
implausibly low daily wage (of less than €16). In addition, we excluded observations from the 
following sectors/enterprises: agriculture, hunting, fishing and forestry, public administration, 
and not-for-profit entities. 
Note that since we are using the cross-sectional version of the LIAB, we are unable to 
track a worker if he/she leaves one establishment for another that is not covered by the IAB 
Establishment Survey, or if he/she exits to non-employment. The same problem arises if a 
worker remains in an establishment that subsequently, and for whatever reason, no longer 
participates in the IAB Establishment Survey. Unfortunately, there is no way of circumventing 
this limitation of the data. Making use of one of the available longitudinal versions of the LIAB, 
or constructing our own LIAB-variant, would not suffice as the key information on the collective 
bargaining status of an establishment in a given year will not be available if the establishment 
fails to take part in the IAB Establishment Survey in that year. (The reader is referred to Heining, 
Scholz, and Seth, 2013, for more information on the LIAB dataset.) 
 
4. Preliminary Data Analysis 
Our analysis is based on two (three-year) clouds of data – annual observations for 2000-2002 
and 2008-2010 – rather than the full 2000-2010 panel. Given the establishment rotation in the 
IAB survey, that disqualifies us in practice from following other than workers in permanent 
panel establishments over a relatively long period, little is lost from our more selective 
approach. Further, it has the advantage of contrasting in a possibly more direct way two 
presumably distinct periods, occurring at the beginning and at the end of the first decade of the 
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present century, marked by a material decline in collective bargaining coverage and in union 
density (see Addison et al., 2011). 
Table 1 presents the main longitudinal features of each subset of observations. Three 
main observations are in order. First, we observe approximately the same number of workers, 
in each sub-period: 2.4 million in 2000-2002 and 1.9 million in 2008-2010. Second, the share of 
individuals appearing in each and every year of each cloud is more or less the same: 29.9 per 
cent in the first interval, 32.9 per cent in the second. Finally, the percentage of individuals who 
are observed at least twice over the two intervals is also approximately constant: 50.9 and 55.8 
per cent of the total, respectively. In sum, the two clouds of data are highly comparable both in 
terms of the number of workers being observed and in their longitudinal profile.  
(Tables 1 and 2 near here) 
In Table 2 we look at the longitudinal pattern of individuals observed at least twice over 
the two observation windows. Here we want to know whether workers stay in the same 
establishment or switch employers. Clearly, either in the case of workers who are observed in 
three consecutive years or for those who are observed in just two years (consecutively or 
otherwise), job stayers massively dominate in each sub-period: on average, only 1 in 100 
workers observed at least twice are job movers. It is this very nature of the LIAB data that 
forces us to identify the union wage effect based on the wage development of job stayers, in 
conjunction with observed changes in establishment collective bargaining status, as further 
elaborated upon in section 5 below.  
Table 3 indicates exactly how often establishments switch their collective agreement 
status, reporting both one-year and two-year transitions. In the interests of economy, we 
aggregate firm and sectoral agreements into a single category. We thus identify ‘any type of 
collective agreement’ here, be it firm-level or industry-wide in scope. (Examination of the two 
separate collective bargaining arrangements is remitted to Appendix Table 1.) 
(Table 3 near here) 
As shown in the table, between 2000 and 2001, for example, 424 out of 3,639 
establishments (or 11.7 per cent) abandoned collective bargaining of either type while 441 out 
of 2,792 (15.8 per cent) joined a collective agreement from an initial state of no coverage. This 
12 
 
means that the percentage of collective bargaining switchers in the total number of possible 
cases is 13.5 per cent (=[(424+441)/6,431]*100). There is therefore a considerable share of 
establishments whose collective bargaining status changes over time, comprising roughly equal 
numbers of joiners and leavers. Note further that approximately the same percentage of 
collective bargaining switchers is observed in 2001-2002, at 12.8 per cent. Similarly, for the 
years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, the percentage of switchers is 11.5 and 6.8 per cent, 
respectively. Two-year transitions are slightly higher than the one-year transitions, at 14.6 and 
10.6 per cent in the first and second sub-periods, respectively. Note that the two-year 
transition rates would be substantially higher than their one-year counterparts had the two 
samples been the same. They are not precisely because two-year transitions in practice require 
establishments to be in the sample for three consecutive years, with the implication that the 
corresponding sample tends to be populated by a substantially higher proportion of permanent 
panel stayers. 
Our estimates of the collective bargaining wage gap were obtained by fitting an 
augmented Mincerian earnings function to the separate cross-sections of data. Specifically, we 
conditioned the wage gap on 24 (67) worker (establishment-) level covariates. The former 
included gender, age (and its square), years of service (and its square), citizenship status, 
education (6 levels), and occupation (12 levels).  The latter comprised dummies for location, 
establishment age, the profit situation, the state of technology, works council status, firm size 
(and its square), and industry (40 2-digit), together with the share of female, fixed-term, foreign 
and skilled workers, and employee median age (see Appendix Table 1). 
(Table 4 near here) 
The results, shown in the first column of Table 4, indicate a positive wage gap of 7 to 14 
per cent in favour of workers covered by sectoral agreements, relative to the comparison group 
of workers in non-covered establishments. This is a sizeable wage gap, consistent with some 
earlier OLS studies. Of some interest here is upward trend of this wage gap. Next, the evidence 
on sectoral versus firm-level agreements points to a wage gap favourable to the former: at 1.8 
to 4.0 per cent. Finally, the third column of the table points unequivocally to higher earnings 
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under any form of collective bargaining than under individual bargaining, the margin amounting 
to some 6.3 to 12.5 per cent. 
We next place our discussion of wage formation in a longitudinal context, allowing for 
unobserved establishment and worker heterogeneity. 
  
5. Estimation strategy 
Let us assume that the (log) gross daily wage for individual i in period t,    ,  is given by: 
                           ,                    (1) 
where    and   denote worker- and firm-specific time-invariant effects, respectively;     is a 
vector of observed time-varying and time-invariant worker- and firm-level characteristics, as 
noted in section 3;    is a time dummy;    is a dichotomous variable indicating the collective 
agreement status of firm j (so that   denotes the collective bargaining wage premium); and     
is the error term of the model. As is conventional, we assume                       .
10 
Given that each observation window (i.e. 2000-2002 and 2008-2010) comprises a 2-year 
interval, one possible route controlling for worker and firm heterogeneity is to take a 2-year 
difference from model (1), to obtain: 
                                                                      .           (2) 
Clearly, in following this approach we are aiming to capture some medium-term effect 
of collective bargaining coverage. Thus, using the sample of job stayers, for whom by 
construction we have (         )   , model (2) yields: 
                                                          .                  (3) 
In other words, given that individuals stay in the same firm, identification of   is achieved via 
workers whose establishments have changed their status from t-2 to t. 
For movers, on the other hand, in general              . This means that under the 
assumption that                         is uncorrelated with            , an OLS 
regression of model (2) will give an alternative estimate of the effect of collective bargaining 
coverage. Identification of   in this case is via job movers whose establishments in t-2 and t 
have the same coverage status vis-à-vis job movers whose establishments have changed their 
status. Unfortunately, as was described in section 2, the number of job movers is too small to 
14 
 
allow us to pursue this approach.  Our empirical strategy will therefore perforce rely solely on 
job stayers.11 
Since we do not want to impose symmetry on the effects of an establishment 
leaving/joining a collective agreement, implementation of our difference-in-differences 
approach is carried out by running the selected models across separate subsamples of 
establishments. These comprise collective bargaining leavers and always members on the one 
hand, and collective bargaining joiners and never members on the other. 
Our 2-year difference strategy of using the two groups of leavers and always members, 
on the one hand, and joiners and never members, on the other, and then regressing the 
changes in the wage outcome indicator on the corresponding change in collective bargaining 
status implicitly either assumes that any macro shock, proxied by a time dummy, has a similar 
impact on both treated and control groups (e.g. leavers and always members, respectively)  or 
that the macro shock does not have any differentiated impact on the decision to leave/stay 
covered by a collective agreement in this particular case. 
But one can obviously presume otherwise. Again taking the case of leavers versus 
always members, the beginning period characteristics may be such that, even after conditioning 
on the set of observables  , selection into the treatment is not exogenous.  In this case,   in 
model (3) will tend to overestimate the causal effect of collective bargaining on worker 
earnings if, say, an adverse shock pressures covered establishments to leave an agreement 
rather than stay covered and where at the same time this shock has a negative impact on 
wages. 
Had we observed, somewhere in the past, a group of establishments entirely similar to 
the group of leavers, and a group of establishments similar to the group of collective bargaining 
stayers, both confronting a similar macro shock, and where neither group had any possibility of 
changing its collective bargaining status in the pre-treatment interval, we would have been in a 
position to obtain a differential adjusted estimate of the causal effect of leaving collective 
bargaining. Formally, this modelling would necessarily entail the possibility that the macro 
effect is different across the treated (T) and control (C) groups. This would require     in model 
(1) to be replaced by     , where      indicates that an individual belongs to group C or T.
12 In 
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this case, the corresponding trend adjusted difference-in-differences estimator (DADD) after 
Bell, Blundell, and van Reenen (1999) is given by: 
 ̂     {  ̅  
   ̅  
     ̅  
   ̅  
  }  {  ̅  
   ̅  
     ̅  
   ̅  
  },   (4) 
where the second term in brackets is the difference-in-differences estimator obtained using the 
earlier interval        ;         is the selected treatment interval; and   ̅  
               
        is the regression-adjusted mean outcome for the treated group. (And similarly for the 
control group C.) Note also that the ‘unadjusted’ difference-in-differences estimator,  ̂  , is 
given solely by the first term in brackets, which can in turn be obtained by using the regression 
model (3) for the sample of job stayers. 
Unfortunately, the trend adjusted estimator in (4) is difficult to implement. In the first 
place, it is very difficult to find a similar business cycle somewhere in past. Here, it is not simply 
a matter of searching for some pre-treatment period with, say, a similar GDP growth rate; 
rather, it is necessary to find a similar interval in which a comparable set of treated and 
untreated establishments are subject to a similar shock. In this context, the selection of a 
(preceding) 2-year interval, for example, is insufficient. And in going further back in time, the 
likelihood of finding similar groups decreases as establishments will change their workforce 
structures and technologies over time. Accordingly, more lies behind any observed differential 
change in wages than just a differential macro shock. More fundamentally, computation of the 
‘trend’ will require, in the          interval, the selection of two sets of firms neither of which is 
exposed to the treatment, that is, with no real chance of changing their collective bargaining 
status. This requirement is highly unlikely to be met in practice in our sample. 
In short, although one might believe that the change in collective agreement status is 
not fully exogenous, the facts of the matter are that going beyond the ‘unadjusted’ difference-
in-differences estimator is likely to rely upon even stronger assumptions. In our 
implementation, therefore, we do not attempt to correct for the possibility that the macro 
effect may be distinct over the treated and control groups. That said, we will seek to check the 
robustness of our results using alternative control groups, noting that even though treated and 
untreated groups may seem to have distinct observable characteristics, it does not necessarily 
follow that the two groups will respond differently to a given shock or, conversely, that a 
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common set of characteristics will generate an identical propensity to change collective 
bargaining status.  
 
6. Two-Year Differences 
Table 5 presents estimates of the collective bargaining premium in the two-year 
difference formulation, using the subset of job stayers. Establishments are grouped into 
separate samples of sectoral and firm-level agreement leavers and joiners and their 
corresponding comparison groups of sectoral and firm agreement stayers (i.e. always members 
and never members), as indicated in the first four columns of the table. The table thus gives the 
2-year effect of collective bargaining – either sectoral or firm-level agreements – on those 
individuals who do not switch jobs between t-2 and t but who happen to be in establishments 
whose status has changed versus individuals whose establishments do not switch status. To 
repeat, identification of the union/collective bargaining effect is obtained via changes in an 
establishment’s collective agreement status, given that workers stay in the same establishment 
over the selected interval. 
(Table 5 near here) 
As can be seen from the table, workers whose establishments leave a sectoral 
agreement for no coverage have their wages reduced by 0.7 per cent over the 2000-2002 
interval, compared with those whose establishments remain covered by a sectoral agreement. 
The corresponding effect for the 2008-2010 period is -0.4 per cent. If, in turn, a firm leaves a 
sectoral agreement and becomes covered by a firm agreement, the effect is less pronounced in 
the first sub-period, at -0.4 per cent, and eventually reversed in the second sub-period, at +0.8 
per cent. 
The evidence from workers whose establishments have joined sectoral agreements is 
stronger than that found for sectoral agreement leavers, at +0.7 and +1.1 per cent in 2000-2002 
and 2008-2010, respectively, in the scenario where the initial state is of no coverage by any 
type of collective agreement. These gains are even larger if the transition is from firm-
agreement coverage, at +1.0 and +2.3 per cent, respectively. Note that the latter result seems 
to contradict the evidence found for sectoral agreement leavers in the second row, last column, 
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in the sense that from the perspective of worker wages it looks equally possible to have higher 
wages either from switching from sectoral to firm agreements or the other way around. Our 
preferred explanation for this apparent contradiction is that two sets of estimates might not be 
extracted from strictly comparable samples (on which more below).  
The remaining four rows of the table examine the transitions between any type of 
coverage and firm agreements, on the one hand, and between any type of collective bargaining 
coverage and no coverage at all, on the other. Thus, in the fifth row, there is a reduction in 
wages for those workers whose establishments left a firm agreement to become ‘uncovered’, 
at -0.9 and -0.7 per cent in the two selected intervals, respectively; while joining a firm 
agreement from no coverage, in the sixth row, is increasingly less favourable to worker wages, 
at 2.4 per cent in 2000-2002, and 0.2 per cent (and statistically insignificant) in 2008-2010. 
Again, there seems to be no evidence of any close symmetry between leaving and joining firm 
agreements, which reiterates the possibility that the corresponding samples may not be strictly 
comparable. Alternatively put, although our results suggest that establishments under firm-
level agreements are expected to generate lower worker wages if they switch to no coverage, 
and to generate higher wages if they switch from no coverage to firm agreements, the lack of 
symmetry in these estimated effects suggest again that, for example, the wages of workers in 
non-covered establishments will not be necessarily similar – all else constant – to the wage of a 
worker in an establishment with a firm agreement had the establishment been covered by this 
type of agreement. This is of course an important caveat that reminds us that our approach is 
quasi-experimental in nature, not a truly experimental exercise. 
The last two rows offer perhaps more clear-cut results. Here we compare the situation 
of no coverage with any type of collective bargaining coverage and the evidence strongly points 
to a negative effect on wages after leaving a sectoral or firm agreement and a positive effect of 
joining any type of collective agreement. The respective losses and gains average -0.6 and +1.1 
per cent, and with a clear decreasing tendency in both transitions. Again, there is no sign of a 
close symmetry in the effects of leaving and joining, but there is nevertheless a strong 
indication that it is better for workers to be associated with covered than non-covered 
establishments. 
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[Table 6 near here] 
Table 6 further exploits the possibility raised in Table 5 that we are not fully controlling 
for unobserved establishment heterogeneity. The presumption here is that a sectoral 
agreement joiner, say, may more closely resemble a sectoral agreement stayer than a sectoral 
agreement ‘never member.’ Table 6 thus compares, for the same sample, sectoral agreement 
joiners with sectoral agreement stayers. Although one may question this new approach – since 
it seems eminently reasonable to suppose that a sectoral agreement joiner and a sectoral 
agreement never member share the same beginning period collective agreement status for 
non-arbitrary reasons – the strategy is worthwhile pursuing as a form of robustness check on 
our findings. Table 6 thus changes the counterfactuals not only for sectoral agreement changers 
but for all other coverage transitions as well. 
And indeed the results are quite striking. Thus, even if one admits, on the evidence 
provided in Table 5, that leaving a sectoral agreement has a negative impact on worker wages 
(taking therefore as a comparison group the subset of always covered), it can be seen from the 
first row of Table 6 that the wage development for workers whose establishments left a 
sectoral agreement is nevertheless comparatively more favourable than is the case where 
workers are in an establishment never covered by any type of agreement. Relative to the latter 
group, there is indeed an average gain of 1.0 per cent in favour of the former.  
The results in the second row of the table are more mixed, with the estimated effect for 
2008-2010 indicating that whenever an establishment switches from a sectoral agreement to a 
firm-level agreement, worker wages go up at higher rate than the wages of those workers in 
establishments always covered by a firm agreement. This seems consistent with the evidence in 
Table 4 of a positive gap favourable to sectoral agreements relative to firm agreements. The 
condition for this interpretation is the assumption that sectoral agreements have a long-lasting 
effect on wage developments, one that cannot be totally offset even after two years. 
The results for sectoral agreement joiners in the third row follow the same script: 
whenever an establishment joins a sectoral agreement, wages presumably go up (based again 
on the evidence provided by Table 5) but by less than would have occurred had the workers 
been in an establishment that remained consistently covered by a sectoral agreement over the 
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corresponding sample period. Indeed, the loss amounts to 1.1 per cent, on average.13 In turn, 
the results in the fifth row suggest that firm agreements have some long-lasting effects, too, as 
workers in establishments leaving firm agreements continue to receive higher wage increases 
than their counterparts in never covered plants.  For its part, the evidence from the sixth row is 
more mixed, with a positive effect in the first sub-period and a negative effect in the second. 
Next, turning to the aggregate category (i.e. coverage by any type of collective 
agreement), the seventh row shows that although the evidence from Table 5 would lead us to 
expect a fall in wages after an establishment leaves a collective agreement of either type, it 
remains the case that the wage change will still be comparatively more favourable than that 
obtained by workers in establishments never covered by a collective agreement. Indeed, an 
average wage gain of 0.9 per cent is anticipated as compared with the negative average value 
of -0.6 per cent recorded in Table 5.  
Conversely, while workers in an establishment joining a collective agreement are 
expected to have, say, a 1 per cent increase in their wage over a period of two years relatively 
to those in an establishment never covered by any form of collective agreement (see the last 
row of Table 5), the corresponding results with the different counterfactual in the last row of 
the Table 6 offer a more qualified story. They show that the wage increase for joining plants is 
comparatively smaller than the wage increases received by workers in those always covered 
establishments. And if anything there is an increasing gap in this regard, amounting to some -
1.3 per cent by the end of our sample period in 2008-2010. 
Finally, in the interests of completeness, we present in Appendix Table 3 the results 
from implementing the spell fixed-effects case (see footnote 12 above). The table provides 
detailed results for the same counterfactuals as in Table 5; that is, it compares joiners with 
never members and leavers with always members. Here, we propose only to offer a brief 
summary of these findings. 
Presumably, with Table 5 as our template, the estimated effects obtained in Appendix 
Table 3 should tend to be smaller in absolute value and perhaps even exhibit perverse signs 
given the essentially immediate or short-run effects captured by one-year changes. On the 
other hand, given that we are now using one-year differences, the number of observations is 
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substantially larger as the number of establishments with two consecutive observations in the 
panel is much higher than the number of establishments with three observations in a row. (The 
former sample is roughly five times bigger than the latter.)  Alternatively put, although we 
might expect the one-year effects to be somewhat messy, their statistical significance might not 
be that low. Even if one does not reject the hypothesis that the effects of, in this case, leaving 
an agreement should measurably increase through time the ‘instantaneous’ impact of the 
transition may yet be non-negligible. 
And that does indeed seem to be the case. After one year, the effect of leaving either a 
sectoral agreement or a firm agreement or any collective agreement is negative, falling in the -
0.4 to -2.1 per cent range (see the first, second, fifth, and seventh rows of the appendix table). 
In turn, the effects of joining (again either a sectoral, firm, or any type of collective agreement) 
are much less clear-cut, especially in the second sub-period, where the coefficients are negative 
or non-significant in all four possible cases (see the third, fourth, sixth, and eighth rows). (In the 
first sub-period the corresponding coefficients vary from 0.3 to 1.2 per cent.)  
These results might lead us to conclude that the effects of an establishment leaving a 
collective agreement on wages are more rapid than the effects of joining. However, the number 
of perverse signs for worker wage changes in establishments that join a collective agreement 
would seem to devalue the one-year difference/spell fixed effects strategy. All things 
considered, then, we prefer to base our conclusions on the firmer ground of estimates derived 
from two-year differences. 
  
7. Conclusions 
That over the last two decades collective bargaining coverage has declined, and that the trend 
persists, seems to be beyond dispute. Much less clear-cut, however, is the impact of this 
decline on wage development. Indeed, the literature lacks a critical value: an updated estimate 
of the union/collective bargaining premium. This is provided in the present treatment which 
covers a period of a near standstill in German wages. 
Whatever the reasons behind the erosion of collective bargaining coverage, we would 
not anticipate an elevated union wage premium, since unions should have become weaker 
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rather than stronger. As a matter of fact, joining any type of agreement from a position of non-
coverage has proven decreasingly favourable to wages, while the reverse transition has become 
decreasingly unfavourable. On the other hand, and looking at the two types of collective 
agreements separately, leaving sectoral agreements to non-coverage does involve losses (albeit 
decreasing), while joining a sectoral agreement from non-coverage entails wage gains at a 
slightly increasing rate. The concatenation of these results obviously implies that workers in 
establishments that have switched to firm agreements from non-coverage are gradually losing 
the wage advantage.  
Our results are not directly comparable with those of previous studies because of 
differences in methodology. Nevertheless, they are consistent with the findings of studies 
seeking to tackle the causality issue in that the collective bargaining premium is smaller than 
more conventional estimates. More importantly of course, and unlike the former, the present 
study is able to chart movements in the collective bargaining premium over the course of the 
first decade of the 2000s. And in terms of broad movements into and out of collective 
bargaining, these changes are in the main consistent with the decline in union influence implied 
by diminishing coverage over that interval.  
That being said, the transitions between firm and sectoral collective agreements do not 
seem to offer any clear-cut conclusions, with indications that establishments switching from 
firm to sectoral agreements tend increasingly to register wage gains, while at the same time 
switching from sectoral to firm agreements seems also to be increasingly beneficial. This 
apparent contradiction seems to be due to the lack of comparability in the selected estimation 
samples, which is not altogether surprising given the non-experimental nature of our exercise. 
More interesting are the results generated by the reverse counterfactuals. Here, the 
most important finding is that although we generally expect workers to have higher wages after 
their establishments join a collective agreement, and lower wages after leaving, the gains – or 
losses – tend to be smaller (in absolute terms) if one compares the treated group (i.e. joiners or 
leavers) with never members or always members, rather than with the initially selected control 
groups of always members and never members. This finding confirms the presence of some 
persistence in the effects of collective bargaining coverage, an anticipated result given the rules 
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governing the German industrial relations as described in section 2. Against this backdrop, we 
distinctly prefer our two-year estimates to any estimate based on a one-year spell fixed effects 
procedure. 
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Endnotes 
1. The link between density and coverage by a collective agreement is noted in Section 2. 
2. A related issue is whether the erosion of the industrial relations architecture might lead to 
‘re-stabilization from above’ and hence greater involvement of the nation state in wage fixing 
via national minimum wages and/or heightened use of extension provisions. 
3. The main exception is the study by Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg (2009), which 
examines a number of explanations for the growth in German wage inequality in the 1990s, 
including changes in collective bargaining. 
4. See also the interesting analysis of the 1995 and 2005 waves of the GSES by Heinbach and 
Spindler (2007), using the Machado-Mata decomposition technique.  
5. Similar results for a different state (Baden-Württemberg) are reported by Bechtel, Mödinger, 
and Strotman (2004). 
6. Stephan and Gerlach also report that the rates of return to human capital as well as the 
gender wage gap are lower in firms with collective agreements than in companies with 
individual contracts.  
7. See also Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005), and Antonczyk, Fitzenberger, and Sommerfeld (2010).  
 8. He also reports the average treatment effect on the treated – or idiosyncratic gain for the 
individual receiving the treatment – which is roughly twice the average treatment effect. 
9. See the excellent survey by Hirsch (2004). 
10. Note that applying OLS to model (1), as was done in Table 3 in a purely cross-section 
fashion, is equivalent to assuming away worker and firm unobserved heterogeneity – or, 
alternatively, that    is not correlated with    , where             . 
11. It would also be possible to use the raw annual data and run the spell fixed-effects version 
of model (1). In this case, by first-differencing within each spell (only consecutive observations 
on job stayers are useable for estimation), we have       and      , and therefore model 
(1) becomes                          , where   denotes the first difference 
operator.  For completeness, we will comment on the results from estimating this model in 
section 6. Note that by computing 3- and 4-year differences, for example, we would have both 
a substantial reduction in the number of workers (as the number of establishments with four 
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and five consecutive observations is much smaller than the number of establishments with two) 
and a sharply increasing proportion of large establishments in the total number of 
establishments with available data. (Model (3) in turn forces us to use only those 
establishments observed in three consecutive years.) 
12. Clearly, the difference-in-differences model in (3) does not contemplate any such 
differential macro effect. Indeed, it assumes   =  . 
13. The results in the fourth row of the table suggest that joining a sectoral agreement from an 
initial state of having a firm agreement is more favourable to wage development than being 
always covered by a sectoral agreement. This finding contradicts the estimates in the fourth 
row of Table 5. The probable reason is sample size, which is quite different in the two 
experiments likely invalidating the comparison. 
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Table 1 
Longitudinal Pattern of Observed Workers 
 
2000-2002 
Year of observation  
Number of workers 
 
Number of establishments 2000 2001 2002 
Yes Yes Yes 721,321 6,279 
Yes  Yes No 327,829 6,687 
Yes No Yes 48,503 4,210 
Yes No No 549,528 9,192 
No Yes Yes 127,890 5,207 
No Yes No 142,360 5,972 
No No Yes 491,841 7,236 
 Total=2,409,272   
 
2008-2010 
2008 2009 2010   
Yes Yes Yes 627,027 6,858 
Yes Yes No 260,129 6,649 
Yes No Yes 77,968 3,901 
Yes No No 461,133 9,060 
No Yes Yes 98,996 5,563 
No Yes No 93,982 5,715 
No No Yes 288,995 7,652 
 Total=1,908,231  
Note:  A given worker necessarily populates one of the seven distinct patterns, but their establishments 
are not necessarily distinct. 
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Table 2 
Longitudinal Pattern of Workers Observed at Least Twice Over the Observation Window 
 
Workers with three consecutive observations 
 
Profile 
Year  
Number of workers 
 
Number of  establishments 2000 2001 2002 
1 A A A 716,844 5,222 
2 A A B 2,168 1,441 
3 A B B 2,283 1,680 
4 A B C 26 68 
 2008 2009 2010    
1 A A A 623,732 6,081 
2 A A B 1,524 1,122 
3 A B B 1,754 1,291 
4 A B C 17 51 
Workers with two consecutive observations 
 2000 2001 2002   
5 A A  325,473 6,176 
6 A B  2,356 1,735 
7  A A 126,439 4,754 
8  A B 1,451 1,207 
 2008 2009 2010   
5 A A  258,710 6,282 
6 A B  1,418 1,134 
7  A A 98,133 5,233 
8  A B 863 826 
Workers with two non-consecutive observations 
 2000 2001 2002   
9 A  A 43,142 2,672 
10 A  B 3,695 1,869 
 2008 2009 2010   
9 A  A 74,832 2,799 
10 A  B 2,092 1,202 
Note: A, B, and C are establishment identifiers. 
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Table 3 
Two- and One-Year Establishment Collective Bargaining Transitions 
 
One-year transitions 
  t+1=2001 
t=2000 Anycb=0 Anycb=1 Total 
Anycb=0 2,351 441 2,792 
Anycb=1 424 3,215 3,639 
Total 2,775 3,656 6,431 
 
 t+1=2002 
t=2001 Anycb=0 Anycb=1 Total 
Anycb=0 2,046 270 2,316 
Anycb=1 405 2,548 2,953 
Total 2,451 2,818 5,269 
 
 t+1=2009 
t=2008 Anycb=0 Anycb=1 Total 
Anycb=0 3,385 412 3,798 
Anycb=1 413 2,931 3,343 
Total 3,798 3,343 7,141 
 
 t+1=2010 
t=2009 Anycb=0 Anycb=1 Total 
Anycb=0 3,340 106 3,446 
Anycb=1 323 2555 2,878 
Total 3,663 2,661 6,324 
 
Two-year transitions 
 t+2=2002 
t=2000 Anycb=0 Anycb=1 Total 
Anycb=0 1,829 301 2,130 
Anycb=1 422 2,415 2,837 
Total  2,251 2,716 4,967 
 
 t+2=2010 
t=2008 Anycb=0 Anycb=1 Total 
Anycb=0 2,776 223 2,999 
Anycb=1 378 2,280 2,658 
Total 3,154 2,503 5,657 
             Note: Anycb denotes the presence, or otherwise, of any collective bargaining – either  
             sectoral or firm-level bargaining.   
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Table 4 
OLS Wage Regressions, Summary Results 
  
  Collective bargaining argument 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
worker is in an establishment 
covered by a sectoral 
agreement; 0 if the 
establishment is not covered by 
any type of agreement 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
worker is in an establishment 
covered by a sectoral agreement; 
0 if the establishment is covered 
by a firm-level agreement 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
worker is in an establishment 
covered by any type of collective 
agreement; 0 otherwise 
2000-2002 
 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 
  0.070*** 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.064*** 0.069*** 0.063*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 769,989 593,733 637,147 756,738 596,214 688,990 867,881 680,348 787,919 
2008-2010 
 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
  0.091***
 
0.115*** 0.140*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.081*** 0.102*** 0.125*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 656,425 485,264 467,885 677,988 472,299 427,984 818,831 587,493 540,864 
Notes: For each cross-section the fitted model is given by               [see model (1) in the 
text].  Standard errors are given in parenthesis. 
***,* denote statistical significance at the .01 level. 
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 Table 5 
Estimates of the Collective Bargaining Premium, Two-Year Differences (2000-2002 and 2008-
2010), Job Stayers 
 
Sample Period: 2000-2002 Period: 2008-2010 
 
Experiment 
 
Treatment and 
control groups 
Collective 
bargaining status 
in 
 
  
 
N 
 
  
 
N 
t-2 t 
 
 
Scb leavers 
vs. 
Scb stayers 
 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Scb=1 
 
Anycb=0 
 
-0.007*** 
(0.0017) 
 
375,3
97 
 
-0.004** 
(0.0018) 
 
289,320 
Control group (stayers) Scb=1 Scb=1 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Scb=1 
 
Fcb=1 
 
-0.004** 
(0.0014) 
 
378,8
43 
 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
 
295,414 
Control group (stayers) Scb=1 Scb=1 
 
 
Scb joiners 
vs. 
Scb never members 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Scb=1 
 
0.007*** 
(0.0017) 
 
46,00
0 
 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
 
66,228 
Control group 
(never members) 
Anycb=0 
 
Anycb=0 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Fcb=1 
 
Scb=1 
 
0.010*** 
(0.0019) 
 
57,84
7 
 
0.023*** 
(0.002) 
 
86,543 
Control group  
(never members) 
Fcb=1 Fcb=1 
 
Fcb leavers 
vs. 
Fcb stayers 
 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Fcb=1 
 
Anycb=0 
 
-0.009*** 
(0.0024) 
 
54,84
9 
 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
 
83,443 
Control group (stayers) Fcb=1 Fcb=1 
 
Fcb joiners 
vs. 
Fcb never members 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Fcb=1 
 
0.024*** 
(0.0019) 
 
44,29
7 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
 
64,992 
Control group  
(never members) 
Anycb=0 
 
Anycb=0 
 
 
Anycb leavers 
vs. 
Anycb stayers 
 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Anycb=1 
 
Anycb=0 
 
-0.009*** 
(0.0013) 
 
447,0
74 
 
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
 
393,165 
Control group (stayers) Anycb=1 Anycb=1 
 
Anycb joiners 
vs. 
Anycb  never members 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Anycb=1 
 
0.014*** 
(0.0013) 
 
50,95
6 
 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
 
69,194 
Control group 
(never members) 
Anycb=0 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Notes: The fitted model is given model (3) in the text.  Anycb is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a worker 
is in an establishment covered by any type of collective agreement, 0 otherwise; Scb (Fcb) is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a worker is in an establishment covered by a sectoral (firm) agreement, 0 
otherwise.  Standard errors are given in parenthesis. 
***,**,* denote statistical significance at the .01. .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Estimates of the Collective Bargaining Premium, Two-Year Differences (2000-2002 and 2008-
2010) but with Different Counterfactuals, Job Stayers 
 
Sample Period: 2000-2002 Period: 2008-2010 
 
Experiment 
 
Treatment and 
control groups 
Collective 
bargaining status 
in 
 
  
 
N 
 
  
 
N 
t-2 t 
 
 
Scb leavers 
vs. 
Scb never members 
 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Scb=1 
 
Anycb=0 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
46,317 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
69,656 
Control group 
 (never members) 
Anycb=0 Anycb=0 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Scb=1 
 
Fcb=1 -0.001 
(0.001) 
61,863 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
93,589 
Control group 
 (never members) 
Fcb=1 Fcb=1 
 
 
Scb joiners 
vs. 
Scb always members 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Scb=1 -0.009*** 
(0.002) 
375,080 
-0.013*** 
(0.002) 
285,892 
Control group 
(always members) 
Scb=1 
 
Scb=1 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Fcb=1 
 
Scb=1 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
374,827 
0.021*** 
(0.002) 
288,368 
Control group  
(always members) 
Scb=1 Scb=1 
 
Fcb leavers 
vs. 
Anycb never members 
 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Fcb=1 
 
Anycb=0  0.004* 
(0.002) 
42,749 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
65,604 Control group 
 (never members) 
Anycb=0 Anycb=0 
 
Fcb joiners 
 vs. 
Fcb always members 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Fcb=1 0.014*** 
(0.002) 
56,397 
-0.015*** 
(0.003) 
82,830 Control group 
( always members) 
Fcb=1 
 
Fcb=1 
 
 
Anycb leavers 
vs. 
Anycb never members 
 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Anycb=1 
 
Anycb=0 0.007*** 
(0.001) 
49,725 
0.010*** 
(0.001) 
73,234 Control group  
(never members) 
Anycb=0 Anycb=0 
 
Anycb joiner 
 vs. 
Anycb always members 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Anycb=1 -0.002 
(0.001) 
448,305 
-0.013*** 
(0.002) 
389,124 Control group 
(always members) 
Anycb=1 
 
Anycb=1 
 
Note: See notes to Table 5. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Two- and One-Year Establishment Transitions by Type of Collective Bargaining 
 
   Two-year transitions 
t=2002 Fcb=1 Nocb=1 Scb=1 Total 
t=2000 Scb=0 
Fcb=1   189 104 81 374 
Scb=0 
Nocb=1  77 1,829 224 2,130 
 
Scb=1 88 318 2,057 2,463 
Total  354 2,251 2,362 4,967 
      t=2010 Fcb=1 Nocb=1 Scb=1 Total 
t=2008 Scb=0 
Fcb=1   244 96 69 409 
Scb=0 
Nocb=1   51 2,776 172 2,999 
  
Scb=1 83 282 1,884 2,249 
Total  378 3,154 2,125 5,657 
 
One-year transitions 
t=2001 Fcb=1 Nocb=1 Scb=1 Total 
t=2000 Scb=0 
Fcb=1   249 110 95 454 
Scb=0 
Nocb=1   99 2,334 331 2,764 
  
Scb=1 113 305 2,758 3,176 
Total 461 2,749 3,184 6,394 
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t=2002 Fcb=1 Nocb=1 Scb=1 Total 
t=2001 Scb=0 
Fcb=1   217 80 82 379 
Scb=0 
Nocb=1   70 2,030 196 2,296 
  
Scb=1 69 319 2,180 2,568 
Total  356 2,429 2,458 5,243 
      t=2009 Fcb=1 Nocb=1 Scb=1 Total 
t=2008 Scb=0 
Fcb=1   330 95 97 522 
Scb=0 
Nocb=1   95 3,368 307 3,770 
  
Scb=1 128 310 2,376 2,814 
Total  553 3,773 2,780 7,106 
      t=2010 Fcb=1 Nocb=1 Scb=1 Total 
t=2009 Scb=0 
Fcb=1   358 46 40 444 
Scb=0 
Nocb=1   22 3,283 82 3,387 
  
Scb=1 27 180 2,130 2,337 
Total  407 3,509 2,252 6,168 
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Appendix Table 2 
Description of Variables   
 
Variable  Definition 
Individual level (variables stemming from the social security records) 
Log daily wage Log of the daily wage of a full-time employee which is top 
coded due to the contribution limit in the German social 
security system 
Log imputed daily wage Log of the daily wage of a full-time employee; values above 
the contribution limit have been imputed using the 
procedure by Gartner (2005) (see data section for further 
information) 
Female Dummy=1 if female 
Age Age in years 
Age squared Age in years, squared 
Foreign Dummy=1 if foreign citizenship 
Secondary / intermediate school leaving certificate 
without completed vocational training 
Dummy=1 if yes 
Secondary / intermediate school leaving certificate 
with completed vocational training 
Dummy=1 if yes 
Upper secondary school leaving certificate (general 
or subject-specific aptitude for higher education) 
without completed vocational training 
Dummy=1 if yes 
Upper secondary school leaving certificate (general 
or subject-specific aptitude for higher education) 
with completed vocational training 
Dummy=1 if yes 
Degree from specialized college of higher 
education 
Dummy=1 if yes 
College or university degree Dummy=1 if yes 
Unskilled manual occupation Dummy=1 if yes 
Skilled manual occupation Dummy=1 if yes 
Technician Dummy=1 if yes 
Engineer Dummy=1 if yes 
Unskilled service occupation Dummy=1 if yes 
Skilled service occupation Dummy=1 if yes 
Semiprofessional Dummy=1 if yes 
Professional Dummy=1 if yes 
Unskilled commercial and administrative 
occupation 
Dummy=1 if yes 
Skilled commercial and administrative occupation Dummy=1 if yes 
Manager Dummy=1 if yes 
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Occupation unknown Dummy=1 if yes 
Tenure  Tenure in years 
Tenure squared Tenure in years, squared 
Establishment level (variables stemming from the IAB Establishment Panel Survey) 
Establishment founded before 1990 Dummy=1 if yes 
 Profit situation in last fiscal year "good" or "very 
good" 
Dummy=1 if yes. This information is derived from the 
establishment's reply to the question "Please give your 
assessment of the profit situation of your business in the last 
fiscal year (2007)". The five possible answers are: 
Profitability was "very good"; "good"; "satisfactory"; 
"sufficient"; "unsatisfactory". 
Technical state of plant and machinery "state of the 
art" or "nearly state of the art" 
Dummy=1 if yes. This information is derived from the 
establishment's reply to the question "How do you assess the 
overall technical state of the plant and machinery, furniture 
and office equipment of this establishment compared to 
other establishments in the same industry?" The five 
possible answers are: "state-of-the-art"; "nearly state-of-the-
art"; "medium"; "nearly obsolete"; "obsolete". 
Share of foreign workers   
Share of high-skilled and skilled workers   
Share of fixed-term workers   
Share of female workers   
Median age of the workforce   
Establishment covered by any collective bargaining 
agreement 
Dummy=1 if yes 
Establishment covered by a sector-level collective 
bargaining agreement 
Dummy=1 if yes 
Establishment covered by a firm-level collective 
bargaining agreement 
Dummy=1 if yes 
Existence of a works council Dummy=1 if yes 
Establishment size Number of employees 
Establishment size squared Number of employees, squared 
Industry (omitted category: machinery and 
equipment) 
40 dummy variables 
German federal state in which establishment is 
located (omitted category: North Rhine-
Westphalia) 
15 dummy variables 
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Appendix Table 3 
Estimates of the Collective Bargaining Premium, Spell Fixed-Effects for 2000-2002 and 2008-2010, 
annual data, Job Stayers 
 
Sample Period: 2000-2002 Period: 2008-2010 
 
Experiment 
 
Treatment and 
control groups 
Collective 
bargaining status 
in 
 
  
 
N 
 
  
 
N 
t-2 t 
 
 
Scb leavers 
vs. 
Scb stayers 
 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Scb=1 
 
Anycb=0 
 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
 
1,341,088 
 
-0.021*** 
(0.001) 
 
1,022,416 
Control group (stayers) Anycb=0 Anycb=0 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Scb=1 
 
Fcb=1 
 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
 
1,348,578 
 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
 
1,034,444 
Control group (stayers) Fcb=1 Fcb=1 
 
 
Scb joiners 
vs. 
Scb never members 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Scb=1 
 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
 
190,094 
 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
  
273,148 
Control group 
(never members) 
Scb=1 
 
Scb=1 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Fcb=1 
 
Scb=1 
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
 
198,341 
 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
 
215,575 
Control group  
(never members) 
Scb=1 Scb=1 
 
Fcb leavers 
vs. 
Fcb stayers 
 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Fcb=1 
 
Anycb=0 
 
-0.014*** 
(0.002) 
 
185,519 
 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
 
203,057 
Control group (stayers) Anycb=0 Anycb=0 
 
Fcb joiners 
vs. 
Fcb never members 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Fcb=1 
 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
 
181,618 
 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 
270,964 
Control group  
(never members) 
Fcb=1 
 
Fcb=1 
 
 
Anycb leavers 
vs. 
Anycb stayers 
 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Anycb=1 
 
Anycb=0 
 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
 
1,617,132 
 
-0.018*** 
(0.001) 
 
1,310,721 
Control group (stayers) Anycb=0 Anycb=0 
 
Anycb joiners 
vs. 
Anycb  never members 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Anycb=1 
 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
 
206,589 
 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
 
287,286 
Control group 
(never members) 
Anycb=1 
 
Anycb=1 
 
Notes: The fitted model in first differences is given by footnote 11 in the text.  See notes to Table 5. 
Standard errors are given in parenthesis. 
***,* denote statistical significance at the .01 and .1 levels, respectively. 
